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Introduction: Nowadays, gambling disorder (GD) is a worldwide health issue and there is a growing need to both
improve our understanding of this disorder and to tailor speciﬁc interventions for its treatment. Moreover, theoretical
models and preliminary empirical results suggest that difﬁculty in regulating emotional states might be involved in
GD. However, literature describing clinical and theoretical aspects of emotional dysregulation among pathological
gamblers (PGs) shows a lack of systematic description. Objectives: We aimed to provide, within an exhaustive
theoretical framework of emotion regulation (ER) processing, empirical evidence supporting a conceptual model of
GD as an ER afﬂiction. Methods: We commented on empirical evidence on the relationship between ER and GD in
the light of two main conceptual models of emotion (dys)regulation. Results: The results suggest there are actual
deﬁcits of ER processing among PGs, manifesting themselves through different ways and in different steps of the ER
timeline. In addition, dysregulation of positive emotions may play a central role in GD. From a clinical point of view,
we pointed out that deﬁcits in ER might be multiple in nature and an assessment for GD should be accurate to identify
the speciﬁc components accounting for the development and maintenance of the disorder. It should also orientate the
clinician in selecting therapeutic objectives. Conclusions: The nature of emotional states that are difﬁcult to regulate
might account for the GD severity and indicate the subtype of PGs the patient belongs to. Treatment programs should
be tailored on the speciﬁcity of PGs.
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INTRODUCTION
Gambling disorder (GD), with its prevalence rate of
0.12%–5.8% (Calado & Grifﬁths, 2016), is currently consid-
ered a major public health issue. Noteworthy, diagnostic
criteria include a reference to a modiﬁcation of mood tone
and emotional experience, suggesting that gambling serves as
a regulator of dysphoric affects (Rosenberg & Feder, 2014).
Theoretically, most authors attempting to understand the
psychological factors underlying GD have often indirectly
suggested the centrality of failures in emotion regulation (ER;
Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Jacobs, 1986; Lesieur, 2001;
McCormick, 1988; McDougall, 2004; Olsen, Lugo, &
Sutterlin, 2015; Sharpe, 2002). ER refers to a transdiagnostic
construct that is relevant to a wide range of disorders and is
deﬁned as the ability to modulate valence, intensity, or time
course of one’s emotional experience and expression coher-
ently with one’s goals and desires (Garofalo, Velotti, &
Zavattini, 2013; Gross, 1998; Thompson, 1990; Velotti &
Garofalo, 2015). Some theories argued for an involvement of
speciﬁc components of emotion dysregulation in deﬁnite
impairments of pathological gamblers’ (PGs) psychological
functioning. For instance, the somatic markers theory of
addiction (Olsen et al., 2015) stated that difﬁculties in emotion
processing account for abnormal decision-making in GD.
In addition, literature (Milosevic & Ledgerwood, 2010)
suggested that the nature of ER motivations underlying
gambling activity differentiates between groups of PGs.
For instance, McCormick (1988) distinguished between
over-stimulated gamblers who gamble in order to decrease
level of arousal and understimulated gamblers who gamble
in order to modify a state of boredom, experienced as
unbearable. This idea has further been integrated with the
hypothesis that early learning experiences (i.e., frequent or
big wins) lead to dysfunctional gambling behavior because
of their association with a modiﬁcation of arousal levels
(Sharpe, 2002). Similarly, Lesieur (2001) differentiated
between action seekers, having high levels of sensation-
seeking and gambling in order to thrill and experience
adrenaline and escape seekers gamblers, with high levels
of depressed mood and gambling to escape from negative
emotional states. In addition, the Blaszczynski and Nower’s
(2002) pathways model of GD differentiated between three
subtypes of PGs, namely the behaviorally conditioned,
the emotionally vulnerable, and the antisocial-impulsivist.
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The second one is characterized by premorbid depression
and/or anxiety and gambles essentially to escape from
dysphoric mood states. On the contrary, the third subtype
shows high impulsivity, low tolerance for boredom, and
antisocial personality traits. Finally, the biopsychosocial
model of Sharpe (2002) further extended these considera-
tions, arguing that horse race gamblers, with high levels of
sensation-seeking, would gamble in order to relieve from
boredom, whereas slot machines gamblers would gamble to
escape from stress and dysphoric mood.
Research evidenced that groups of PGs differ in relation
to comorbidities (Suomi, Dowling, & Jackson, 2014).
Whereas one subtype is thought to frequently suffer from
depressive or anxious disorders, another would be more
subject to substance abuse or cluster B personality disorder.
Preliminary contributions indicate that emotional dysregu-
lation might be involved in the relationship between GD and
psychiatric conditions as mood and anxiety disorders
(Lorains, Cowlishaw, & Thomas, 2011), pathological nar-
cissism (Rogier & Velotti, 2018), borderline personality
disorder (Brown, Allen, Dowling, Allen, & Dowling,
2015), and antisocial personality disorder (Blum, Leppink,
& Grant, 2017; Rogier, Velotti, & Zavattini, 2017). An
exhaustive model of ER-processing failures among PGs
might aid in the identiﬁcation of common features account-
ing for speciﬁc comorbidities and potential pathways by
which psychiatric disorders lead to the development or
maintenance of GD.
As a whole, different models referred to a multiplicity of
ER deﬁcits accounting for distinct features of GD. However,
the literature describing clinical and theoretical aspects of
emotional dysregulation among PGs shows a lack of sys-
tematic description within a coherent theoretical framework.
For example, such models did not explain the relationships
between these deﬁcits and GD. Indeed, the processes lead-
ing to the use of gambling as an emotional regulation
strategy are not clear. In addition, authors often used vague
descriptions of ER deﬁcits involved in GD, resulting in a
confused understanding of the topic. It is necessary to
clearly identify the nature of such variables for optimal
clinical interventions. There is quite a difference in asserting
that the treatment should focus on alexithymia features
(i.e., a difﬁculty to identify and verbally express own
feelings) or emotional impulsivity (i.e., a tendency to act
rashly when experiencing emotional states). To bridge such
gaps, the present paper offers a comment on empirical
evidence supporting the relationship between ER and GD
in the framework of exhaustive and reﬁned models of
dysregulation of emotions. Throughout the following sec-
tions, we will argue that GD can be conceptualized as an ER
afﬂiction in the sense that deﬁcits in ER-processing account
for etiology and maintenance of GD. Our main objective
was to use validated models of ER to provide a detailed
description of ER failures among PGs, adding hypotheses
toward the relationship between these failures and develop-
ment and maintenance of GD. In doing so, we attempted to
explain how speciﬁc failures in ER act as vulnerability
factors for the development of GD. In addition, we wanted
to show that peculiar mechanisms of emotion dysregulation
characterize and maintain GD throughout their interaction
with other central cognitive, behavioral, and interpersonal
variables. Finally, we suggested that an ER framework is
able to explain heterogeneity within the PGs category,
shedding light on the differences between subtypes of PGs
and their speciﬁc comorbidities.
METHODS
To achieve the aims of the study, we integrated validated
models of ER-processing failures within the current under-
standing of GD. In doing so, we reviewed ER literature and
selected two main models of ER. Within the range of ER
models, researchers deserved a particular attention to the
proposal of Gratz and Roemer (2004), successfully applied
to the understanding of both well-being (Balzarotti,
Biassoni, Villani, Prunas, & Velotti, 2016; Velotti, Garofalo,
Bottazzi, & Caretti, 2017) and psychopathology (Aldao,
Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Garofalo, Holden,
Zeigler-Hill, & Velotti, 2016; Garofalo & Velotti, 2015,
2017; Velotti et al., 2016). Indeed, the model avoids risks
related to a vague deﬁnition of emotion dysregulation pro-
viding an integrative conceptualization of difﬁculties in ER.
The authors assert that the construct of ER should go beyond
modulation of arousal or emotional expression and encom-
pass other components as awareness, understanding, and
acceptance of emotions as well as the ability to act in desired
ways regardless of emotional state. Noteworthy, the model
underlines that healthy ER should consist in the capacity to
modulate rather than eliminate aversive emotional states. In
line with these assumptions, the authors identiﬁed four main
components of emotional dysregulation, namely (a) an im-
paired awareness and understanding of emotions, (b) a
difﬁculty in accepting emotional states, (c) a poor ability to
refrain from impulsive behavior when experiencing negative
emotional states, and (d) an inadequate perception of effective
and available ER strategies.
Despite its utility, this approach suffers from important
limitations, failing to describe the processual nature of
healthy ER. A process model of ER seems useful to identify
potential waterfall effects between different ER dysfunc-
tions, shedding light on the components that should be
targeted with priority by clinical interventions. In this sense,
an exhaustive model of ER in GD would avoid errors in the
selection of the strategic objectives and would prevent
inefﬁcacy of clinical interventions. Thus, we thought to
complete our understanding of ER in GD using the model
developed by Gross and John (2003). A model which asserts
that ER process goes through a timeline consisting of ﬁve
points, namely (a) situation selection, (b) situation modiﬁ-
cation, (c) attentional deployment, (d) cognitive change, and
(e) response modulation. ER strategies implemented during
the ﬁrst four points are labeled “antecedent-focused” strate-
gies, as the modiﬁcation is carried out before the elicitation
of the emotional state. On the contrary, strategies belonging
to the last category are labeled “response-focused,” targeting
an emotional state already raised. Recently, Sheppes, Suri,
and Gross (2015) extended the model by asserting that ER
processes, emerging after the arousal of emotional states,
can be understood as the result of three main stages
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(Identiﬁcation, Selection, and Implementation) with the ﬁrst
being preparatory for the following. Furthermore, each stage
is thought to be composed of three successive operations,
namely Perception, Valuation, and Action. In the Identiﬁ-
cation stage, the individual has ﬁrst to adequately represent
emotional state and the general goal of a regulated emotional
response (Perception step). Then, during the Valuation
operation, the emotional and regulated states received a
value in term of costs and beneﬁts. If the regulated state
receives sufﬁcient positive valuations, the general ER signal
is activated (Action step). Supposing that this stage leads to
the decision to regulate the emotional state, ER processes of
the Selection stage are activated to determinate the nature of
the general regulatory category that has to be used. In this
stage, if the individual correctly represents available general
regulatory categories (Perception step), he would be able to
access to the next step, which consists of the valuation of
beneﬁts and costs related to these categories (Valuation
step). If the balance beneﬁts/costs is positive, the regulatory
category would be activated (Action step). The ﬁnal stage
(Implementation) determines the nature of speciﬁc regula-
tory strategies that are to be used. Again, the individual has
to correctly represent the available range of ER strategies
(Perception step), to evaluate each of them in terms of
beneﬁts and costs (Valuation step) and to execute the
selected one (Action step).
Given the heuristical value of these two main models of
emotion (dys)regulation, our hypotheses toward the rela-
tionships between ER and GD have been discussed follow-
ing the timeline model of Sheppes et al. (2015) of healthy
ER processing and integrating the concepts related to
speciﬁc emotion dysregulation components described in the
Gratz and Roemer’s model (2004).
RESULTS
As illustrated in Figure 1, we found that empirical contribu-
tions support the hypothesis that speciﬁc failures among the
three main stages of ER-processing account for the devel-
opment and the maintenance of GD.
Failures in the Identiﬁcation stage
According to Sheppes et al. (2015), potential failures of ER
processes might be identiﬁed in the early Identiﬁcation
stage, which occurs after the arousal of an emotional state
and ends with the decision to regulate it or not.
Failures in the Perception step. Decision to regulate an
emotional state or not is primarily related to the capacity to
adequately represent emotions. As suggested by different
empirical evidence, this ability may be impaired in indivi-
duals suffering from GD.
To this point, results drawn from studies investigating the
link between GD and alexithymia are insightful. Most studies
found a higher level of alexithymia in samples of PGs
compared to samples of healthy subjects (Lumley & Roby,
1995; Parker, Wood, Bond, & Shaughnessy, 2005; Toneatto,
Lecce, & Bagby, 2009). However, the results related to the
speciﬁc dimensions of alexithymia are in contrast with some
studies that ﬁnd that PGs have poorest capacity to verbally
express their feelings compared to control groups (Aïte et al.,
2014; Parker et al., 2005; Toneatto et al., 2009) and with other
studies that fail to ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences (Lumley &
Roby, 1995). Similarly, whereas in some studies, PGs
showed a normal capacity to identify emotional states; most
researches evidenced a speciﬁc deﬁcit in theses capacities
(Lumley & Roby, 1995; Parker et al., 2005). Finally,
Perception step
Action step
Identification of emotional state
Gambling 
Disorder
Selection of short-
term strategies 
category (narrow 
focus)
Under-representation of negative 
emotions
Increased emotional 
distress (e.g., helpless, 
guilty, anxious, 
depressed)
Selection of ER strategies category Implementation of ER strategies
Persistent and recurrent 
problematic gambling 
behavior, chasing
Emotional 
arousal
Over negative valuations of 
negative emotional states leading to 
expressive suppression
Over positive valuations of escape
based strategies leading to 
experiental avoidance
Untranslation of valutations in a 
valid output signal for action
Under representation of repertoire of 
regulative strategies, focused on 
escapism
Over representation of gambling as 
an emotion regulation strategy
Over positive valuations and under 
negative valuations of short-term 
regulatory categories
Untranslation of the valuations in a 
valid output signal for action
Over positive valuations and under 
negative valuations of gambling as 
an emotion regulation strategy
Translation of the output signal in 
disadaptive emotion regulation 
strategies
Figure 1. Potential failures in the three main steps of ER-processing accounting for gambling disorder
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research often showed signiﬁcant and positive relation-
ships between alexithymia and the severity of GD
(Cosenza, Baldassare, Matarazzo, & Nigro, 2014; Elmas,
Cesur, & Oral, 2017; Gori et al., 2016; Mitrovic & Brown,
2009; Parker et al., 2005).
In addition, several studies investigated the topic
throughout the use of the Difﬁculties in Emotion Regulation
Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). This instrument
evaluates different aspects of emotion dysregulation, such
as lack of emotional awareness and emotional clarity, which
ﬁt well with the description of failures in the capacity to
adequately represent emotional states. Surprisingly, some
studies failed to show signiﬁcant associations between GD
and a general deﬁcit in ER capacities (Ciccarelli, Nigro,
Grifﬁths, Cosenza, & D’Olimpio, 2016; Schreiber, Grant, &
Odlaug, 2012). On the other side, scholars reported empiri-
cal data supporting the hypothesis of general difﬁculties to
regulate negative emotional states among PGs (Elmas et al.,
2017; Poole, Kim, Dobson, & Hodgins, 2017; Rogier &
Velotti, 2018). For example, the study of Estévez, Herrero,
Sarabia, and Jauregui (2014) showed that almost all DERS
subscales were signiﬁcantly related to GD severity. How-
ever, because of methodological limitation of the study
(related to GD measure), the interpretation of such results
should be cautious. More reliable data supporting a connec-
tion between emotion dysregulation and GD came to light
with a study carried out by Jauregui, Estevez, and Urbiola
(2016), indicating high levels of emotion dysregulation
among PGs as well as a positive correlation between the
DERS’s scores and GD severity. However, the authors
showed that non-awareness and non-clarity factors were
not signiﬁcantly related to the severity of GD. On the
contrary, two studies (Rogier & Velotti, 2018; Williams,
Grisham, Erskine, & Cassedy, 2012) found that the DERS’s
subscales signiﬁcantly correlated with the severity of the
disorder suggesting that PGs may suffer from a difﬁculty in
identifying and discriminating their own feelings.
As argued by Olsen et al. (2015), a difﬁculty to identify
one’s own emotional states may lead to an impairment in
decision-making. This issue is particularly relevant in
relation to GD where the individual seems unable to use
the information contained in an aversive emotional state
related to a negative external feedback. In other words,
the negative emotion related to a loss might not be used to
interrupt gambling behavior and consequently favor chasing
behavior.
Failures in the Valuation step. An accurate representa-
tion of emotional states is not sufﬁcient to successfully
decide whether to carry forward the emotional regulation
process or not. Once the individual has perceived the
emotional state, he has to evaluate costs and beneﬁts related
to both the maintenance of the emotion and a regulated state.
As stressed by Sheppes et al. (2015), overestimating emo-
tional states, together with positive beliefs toward efforts to
escape from them, may lead to an overregulation of emo-
tional states. As previously stated, an overregulation of
negative emotional states is believed to be maladaptive,
because it might lead to their intensiﬁcation and preclude the
possibility to use the information contained in emotions,
which are useful for behaving in an adaptive way (Damasio,
1999).
Several empirical evidence suggest that PGs may
experience failures in such thresholds. For example, some
studies (Jauregui, Estevez, et al., 2016; Williams et al.,
2012), which use the non-acceptance DERS’ subscale,
showed that individuals with GD have a difﬁculty in
accepting their own emotional states in a non-judgmental
way, reacting with shame and disappointment. Similar
results have been brought by scholars who investigated
mindfulness capacity among PGs. Mindfulness refers to
the ability to bring awareness and non-judgmental accep-
tance to one’s present moment experience of thoughts,
emotions, and bodily sensations (Bishop et al., 2004).
Interestingly, mindfulness is negatively related to GD se-
verity (Lakey, Campbell, Brown, & Goodie, 2007; Reid, Di
Tirro, & Fong, 2014; Riley, 2012), suggesting that PGs may
have a deﬁcit in the ability to accept emotional states in a
non-judgmental way. In addition, studies on metacognition
capacities among PGs provided preliminary evidence that
GD severity may be related to positive beliefs toward the
need to control thoughts (Jauregui, Urbiola, & Estevez,
2016; Lindberg, Fernie, & Spada, 2011; Mansueto et al.,
2016; Spada & Roarty, 2015). PGs often believe that certain
types of thoughts have to be suppressed, and this has been
demonstrated by Riley (2012), which reported high levels of
thought suppression among PGs. As outlined by Sheppes
et al. (2015), disproportionate negative valuation of emo-
tions (i.e., non-acceptance and poor mindfulness) together
with disproportionate positive valuations of efforts to escape
emotions have been thought to overactivate ER mechanisms
and consequently lead to experiential avoidance (Sheppes
et al., 2015). To this point, it has been showed that experi-
ential avoidance mediates the link between thought suppres-
sion and mindfulness with GD severity (Riley, 2012). These
failures may act as vulnerability factors for GD as an
overregulation of negative emotional states (leading to
heightened emotional arousal) and difﬁculty to accept them
(leading to secondary negative emotional states), thereby
increasing the ER demand the individual has to front.
Failures in the Action step. Once emotions have been
correctly represented and a valuation toward the opportunity
to regulate them or not has been formulated, the individual
has to adequately translate such valuations in a valid output
signal for action. At this point, a number of reasons may
account for a failure and consequently make an obstacle for
the correct ER process. Helplessness refers to the belief that,
in front of adverse stimuli, the individual has no ways to
control it and he has no choice but endure it. Interestingly, it
has been noted that helplessness is particularly common
among PGs (McCormick, 1994). Coherently with the refor-
mulated learned helplessness theory (Abramson, Seligman,
& Teasdale, 1978), GD severity is positively related to a
tendency to attribute negative events to internal, global, and
stable causes (McCormick & Taber, 1988). This attribu-
tional style has been related to poor malleability beliefs
toward emotions in depressed individuals, leading to a view
of emotions as unknowable and uncontrollable (Kneeland,
Dovidio, Joormann, & Clark, 2016). Moreover, pessimistic
attribution styles have been related to dysfunctional ER
strategies (e.g., rumination), which in turn are associated
with chasing among adult gamblers (Atlas & Peterson,
1990). Despite positive valuations of a regulated state and
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negative valuations of the current emotional states, PGs who
experience helplessness may be unable to translate such
valuations into action. Consequently, the more intense the
emotional states, the less able a PG would be to achieve this
threshold.
As a whole, failures in the Identiﬁcation stage may
account for GD because of resulting heightened arousal
levels and impairments in decision-making. In addition,
these elements shed light on frequent comorbidities
observed between GD and other psychiatric conditions.
Indeed, alexithymic features as well as experiential avoid-
ance have been related to some of these co-occurring
disorders as depression (Li, Zhang, Guo, & Zhang, 2015;
Sloan et al., 2017), anxiety disorders (De Berardis et al.,
2008; Newman & Llera, 2011), and borderline personality
disorder (Lysaker et al., 2017; Sloan et al., 2017; Vaddiparti
& Cottler, 2017). As such, ER deﬁcits among the Identiﬁ-
cation stage of ER processing offer a potential explanation
of the pathway by which these disorders lead to the devel-
opment of GD.
Failures in the Selection stage
Once an individual has correctly achieved the Identiﬁcation
step and decided to regulate his emotional state, he has to
select the more appropriate category of ER strategy to use.
Again, literature suggests that PGs experience important
failures among these stages.
Failures in the Perception step. To adequately decide
which of the ER categories ﬁts better with the intent to
regulate emotional states, individuals need to have a correct
representation of available general regulatory categories. At
this level, PGs may have a limited representation of regula-
tory options. For example, Williams et al. (2012) and Rogier
and Velotti (2018) found that GD severity was positively
and signiﬁcantly related to a limited capacity to access
effective regulation strategies. In this sense, an underrepre-
sentation of general regulatory categories may conceal some
adaptive choices and favor extreme decisions promoting the
goal of escaping self-awareness. Recent studies examining
the endorsement of gambling as an escape among PGs
converge toward this hypothesis (Weatherly & Cookman,
2014). In line with this reasoning, a misrepresentation of
available regulatory categories may be due to a poor conﬁ-
dence in the ability to effectively use some of them. For
example, an individual may be aware of the existence of
cognitive change regulation strategies that would be an
effective choice but considers himself unable to use
them and consequently he would not represent them within
the range of available regulatory categories. Poor self-
efﬁcacy predicts emotional dysregulation (Luberto, Cotton,
McLeish, Mingione, & O’Bryan, 2014) and positive expec-
tations toward the success of ER predict better ER perfor-
mance (Bigman, Mauss, Gross, & Tamir, 2016). Directly
related to this point, preliminary results showed that GD
severity is related to the belief of being unable to refuse
gambling when experiencing an emotional state, positive
or negative (Casey, Oei, Melville, Bourke, & Newcombe,
2008). As a result, PGs may suffer from a narrow focus on
escape strategies category, resulting in an underrepresenta-
tion of other available and effective regulatory categories.
Failures in the Valuation step. Despite failures in previ-
ous steps being relevant to the explanation of ER difﬁculties
among PGs, an important role may be played by dysfunc-
tions in the process of evaluating beneﬁts and costs of
speciﬁc regulatory categories.
The Theory of Urgency, developed by Cyders and Smith
(2008a) and successfully applied to GD, seems speciﬁcally
insightful. Referring to a neurobiological description of the
relationship between emotions, ER, and action (Davidson,
2003), the authors assert that, within the range of variables
that mediate the occurrence of an emotional state and the
inhibition of its behavioral correspondent, the capacity to
focus on long-term interests may be central. Indeed, an
individual would inhibit an impulsive behavior related to an
emotional state because of his anticipation of another one
related to the frustration or the achievement of a long-term
goal. However, a poor capacity to focus on course of action
providing long-term beneﬁts and a converse tendency to
behave in order to obtain immediate return may invalid such
ER processing. In that sense, positive past reinforcements
related to escape strategies may contribute to erroneous and
high valuations of the escape regulatory category (Petry,
2005). In relation to it, research focusing on the role of
cognitive impulsivity among GD suggests that PGs may
have difﬁculty in adequately planning the consequences of
their behaviors by underestimating the costs of an impulsive
action (Passanisi & Pace, 2017). In line with this result,
some authors found a positive association between severity
of GD and difﬁculty in pursuing goal-directed behaviors
when experiencing a negative emotional state (Williams
et al., 2012). Moreover, impulsive action among PGs has
been related to an abnormally high focus on reward com-
pared to the normal population (Kräplin et al., 2014).
This last point may offer an additional perspective from
which discuss the issue related to the classiﬁcation of GD as
an addiction disorder or as an impulse control disorder
(ICD). Indeed, in ICDs, behavior is thought to be pursued
as a result of negative reinforcements (decreasing anxiety
or stress), whereas in substance addiction, the behavior
involves pleasure, being intrinsically rewarding and result-
ing from positive reinforcements (Fauth-Bühler, Mann, &
Potenza, 2017). However, we underline that abnormal
reward sensitivity plays an important role in the ER dys-
functions emerging in this step. In this perspective, cogni-
tive impulsivity would account for GD because of its
association with excessive reward sensitivity, adding further
support to the classiﬁcation of GD as an addiction disorder.
Failures in the Action step. The ﬁnal step of the Selection
process consists in triggering the general regulatory catego-
ry selected. Having a clear representation and making an
accurate valuation of an adaptive regulatory category are not
sufﬁcient: especially for adaptive but cognitively expensive
regulatory categories, it is not assumed that individuals have
the abilities required to apply them. For example, Sheppes
et al. (2015) underline that cognitive change regulation
strategies need perspective-taking capacities and an intact
theory of mind. Despite perspective-taking is fundamentally
different from cognitive reappraisal (Dunn, Billotti,
Murphy, & Dalgleish, 2009), difﬁculties in the capacity to
be objective or to view the adverse stimulus as a detached,
third-person observer may alter cognitive reappraisal
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attempts (Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012). Actually, PGs
showed impaired perception of emotions in others
(Kornreich et al., 2016), poor empathy, and interpersonal
perspective-taking (Tomei, Besson, & Grivel, 2017). In line
with this, some noted that low empathy was positively
related to gambling as an escape (Weatherly & Miller,
2013). Moreover, the relationship between gambling behav-
ior and antropomorphization of slot machines, resulting
from erroneous mind attributions and being a typical cog-
nitive bias of PGs, has been showed to relevantly increase
under the inﬂuence of intense emotional arousal (Riva,
Sacchi, & Brambilla, 2015).
Failures in the Selection stage probably account for the
process by which deﬁcits in ER processing lead PGs to
select the escape strategies category to regulate emotional
states. Noteworthy, these deﬁcits appear to be the important
candidates in the explanation of some comorbidities in GD.
First, an excessive narrow focus on ER escape-based strat-
egies is probably favored by depressive symptoms. Prelimi-
nary results indicated that depression leads to gambling
behavior throughout a decreased gambling refusal self-
efﬁcacy (Takamatsu, Martens, & Arterberry, 2016). Then,
high impulsivity has been indicated as a common risk factor
for bipolar disorder (Saddichha & Schuetz, 2014), cluster B
personality disorders (American Psychiatric Association,
2013), and attention-deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (Davtian,
Reid, & Fong, 2012). In addition, dysfunctions in reward
sensitivity might explain the frequent co-occurrence of
GD with bipolar (Nusslock et al., 2012) and antisocial
personality disorders (Morgan, Bowen, Moore, &
van Goozen, 2014). In addition, depression seems to in-
crease abnormal responses to monetary rewards among PGs
(Fauth-Bühler et al., 2014). Finally, impaired theory of
mind has been showed to characterize both major depression
and borderline personality disorder, potentially acting as a
vulnerability factor for the development of GD (Richman &
Unoka, 2015)
Failures in the Implementation stage
Once Identiﬁcation and Selection stages have been
achieved, ER processing goes through a ﬁnal level, which
consists of the decision of which speciﬁc ER tactic is to be
used (Sheppes et al., 2015). In relation to GD, a number of
hypotheses regarding the nature of potential failures occur-
ring in the Implementation stage can be formulated.
Failures in the Perception step. To make a successful
decision, one must correctly represent the range of available
regulatory tactics belonging to the broader regulatory cate-
gory that was previously selected.
Interestingly, Hudson, Jacques, and Stewart (2013) di-
vided gamblers into three categories according to predomi-
nant motivation, resulting in two categories related to
emotional motives. They pointed out the presence of atten-
tive biases congruent with the motivation categories. In this
way, the study opened the possibility of a link between some
perceptive aspects and the use of gambling as an ER
strategy, speciﬁcally evident at high levels of severity of
the disorder. Therefore, the study suggested that speciﬁc
attentive biases underline an erroneous representation of the
available range of ER strategies among PGs.
Failures in the Valuation step. The representation of
available regulatory tactics is followed by their evaluations,
in term of costs and beneﬁts in order to formulate an optimal
choice.
Again, research on metacognitions among PGs brought
interesting results. Some studies indicate that PGs have
high levels of positive beliefs toward the use of persevera-
tive thinking (Jauregui, Urbiola, et al., 2016; Mansueto
et al., 2016; Spada & Roarty, 2015). More closely related
to the addictive behavior, it seems that, as previously
discussed for alcohol drinking (Cooper, Frone, Russell,
& Mudar, 1995; Garofalo & Velotti, 2015), PGs have high
expectancies toward the efﬁciency of gambling as a regu-
latory strategy. For example, Spada, Giustina, Rolandi,
Fernie, and Caselli (2015) examined metacognitive beliefs
toward gambling and showed that PGs consider gambling
as a useful strategy to improve cognitive-emotional state.
Finally, a very recent study indicated that speciﬁc meta-
cognition beliefs about gambling were signiﬁcantly asso-
ciated with GD severity among a sample of PGs (Caselli
et al., 2018).
In line with these results, studies examining self-reported
motivations for gambling are speciﬁcally insightful. Two
studies (MacLaren, Harrigan, & Dixon, 2012; Shead &
Hodgins, 2009) evidenced that most PGs described them-
selves as motivated by a positive valuation of gambling
activity due to its capacity to regulate negative or positive
emotional states. In addition, Weatherly and Cookman
(2014) observed that gambling to escape from negative
emotions strongly predicted GD severity and was positively
predicted by every subscale of the DERS.
Finally, empirical evidence shows that PGs have an
impaired awareness toward their success in gambling task
(Brevers et al., 2014), failing to objectively evaluate the
negative consequences of gambling activity. Such results
conﬁrmed previous research on typical overconﬁdence bias
among PGs (Fortune & Goodie, 2012; Goodie, 2005).
Therefore, high expectancies toward the beneﬁts associated
with gambling activities (in terms of emotional relief) seem
to be combined with a pathological underestimation of the
potential costs of such ER tactic among PGs.
Failures in the Action step. The ﬁnal step in the ER
processing requires the ability to trigger the speciﬁc regula-
tory tactic that was previously selected. In addition to the
gambling behavior, PGs may implement other maladaptive
ER strategies, reinforcing gambling behavior, and increas-
ing ER challenges.
Surprisingly, PGs in the study by Williams et al. (2012),
which showed high levels of emotional dysregulation, did
not differ from healthy participants in the measure of
reappraisal or suppression. Similarly, Barrault, Bonnaire,
and Herrmann (2017), among their sample of regular poker
players, did not ﬁnd any association between ER strategies
and GD severity. On the contrary, Navas et al. (2017)
observed that PGs were particularly inclined to suppress
the expression of emotional states, compared with healthy
subjects. The results brought by Canale, Verzeletti, Caval-
lari, Pastore, and Santinello (2013) conﬁrmed such ﬁndings
but underlined that the use of reappraisal was not associated
with GD severity. However, the frequency of gambling
among women correlated positively with the tendency to
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reformulate the meaning of a situation in order to reduce its
emotional impact (reappraisal). This result, apparently coun-
terintuitive, may be explained by the fact that focusing on
positive aspects of an aversive situation may be counterpro-
ductive in a context of gambling, leading the individual to
chase. In line with this conclusion, Heilman, Cris¸an, Miclea,
Miu, and Houser (2010) brought similar results examining
the effect of reappraisal and suppression in a task of decision-
making. Researchers found that the use of reappraisal toward
negative emotions was associated with the reduction of risk
avoidance and consequently with the promotion of risky
decisions. This data goes in the same direction of studies
where reappraisal has been found to reduce arousal related to
risk aversion (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). Similarly, Navas,
Verdejo-García, Lo´pez-Go´mez, Maldonado, and Perales
(2016) observed that PGs were more inclined to use
positive refocusing strategy than the healthy subjects.
Researchers highlight that this strategy involves the dis-
placement of attention from negative emotions without a
cognitive processing of information related to the causes of
the emotion. The study also evidenced that gamblers made
a great use of dysfunctional cognitive-type ER strategies,
such as catastrophizing and self-blame. On the contrary,
Pace, Zappulla, Di Maggio, Passanisi, and Craparo (2015)
found that PGs made a minor use of reappraisal compared
to both non-PGs and problematic gamblers, whereas dif-
ferences did not emerge in relation to suppression. Such
discrepancy may be due to the nature of the sample,
probably encompassing slot machines gamblers only in a
minor measure.
As a whole, failures in the Implementation stage lead the
individual to select and implement gambling behavior as an
ER strategy. Moreover, some of these failures might be
reinforced in case of speciﬁc comorbidities. For example,
individuals with narcissistic personality disorder suffer from
abnormal overconﬁdence toward their performance and may
be speciﬁcally vulnerable to fail in the valuation of costs
related to gambling behavior (Lakey, Rose, Campbell, &
Goodie, 2008). Finally, similarities in metacognitive dys-
functions among GD and traditional addictions (Spada,
Caselli, Nikčevic´, & Wells, 2015) suggest that common
impairments in the Implementation stage of ER processing
could partially account for their frequent co-occurrence.
DISCUSSION
Our paper aimed to provide, within an exhaustive theoretical
framework of ER processing, empirical evidence supporting
a conceptual model of GD as an ER afﬂiction. At this point
of the paper, we are allowed to draw some conclusions.
First, the research evidences actual deﬁcits of ER processes
among the addicted gamblers, manifested in different
ways and in different stages of the ER timeline. The
studies suggest that PGs fail to functionally achieve the
Identiﬁcation stage because of a deﬁcit in emotional aware-
ness, a difﬁculty in accepting emotional states and a poor ER
self-efﬁcacy. Then, failures in the Selection stage may arise
from a narrow and rigid focus on escape strategies, a
preference for short-term reward strategies and from im-
paired perspective taking and theory of mind. Finally,
dysfunctions in the Implementation of regulatory tactics
may occur due to attentive biases related to gambling,
positive metacognitive beliefs toward gambling as a regu-
lation strategy, and an excessive expressive suppression of
emotional states. We evidenced that different deﬁcits in ER
processing may lead to the development and the mainte-
nance of GD throughout their interaction with cognitive,
behavioral, and interpersonal variables. Furthermore, this
conceptual model appears a helpful framework in the
understanding of comorbidity in GD. Indeed, we shed light
on common ER impairments underlying these disorders and
on potential pathways by which they lead to the develop-
ment of GD.
However, we evidenced that empirical data concerning
the relationship between ER and GD are sometimes incon-
sistent (Ciccarelli et al., 2016; Schreiber et al., 2012). The
contrasting nature of results in the GD ﬁeld is potentially
due to the excessive heterogeneity of this category. In
relation to ER framework, it means that the relationship
between emotion dysregulation and GD should be under-
stood in the light of this heterogeneity. For example, sub-
typing models of GD often pointed out a central issue,
mostly neglected by studies investigating the relationships
between ER and GD: the regulation of positive emotions.
It has been argued that difﬁculties to regulate positive
emotional states account for psychopathology (Carl, Soskin,
Kerns, & Barlow, 2013) and especially for addiction
(Carroll & Huxley, 1994). In line with this, a subtype of
PGs is often described as seeking strong sensation and
excitement and as gambling to increase mood tone
(Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Lesieur, 2001; Sharpe,
2002), suggesting peculiar difﬁculties in the regulation of
positive emotions.
Several preliminary studies investigated the role of dys-
regulation of positive emotion in relation to GD. In situation
selection and modiﬁcation, PGs may have an excessive
approach to positive emotions as indicated by high levels
of reward sensitivity and low sensitivity to punishment
(Gaher, Hahn, Shishido, Simons, & Gaster, 2015; Loxton,
Nguyen, Casey, & Dawe, 2008; van Holst, van den Brink,
Veltman, & Goudriaan, 2010). Another important variable
that accounts for the selection of situation is affective
forecasting, which is the process of anticipating the hedonic
consequences of future events. In the general population, the
impact bias refers to the adaptive tendency to overestimate
the intensity of emotional reactions when anticipating an
adverse event. Interestingly, Willner-Reid, Smith, Jones,
and MacLeod (2012) noted that low levels of impact bias
among PGs account for an exaggerate motivation to ap-
proach to hedonistic but potentially risky situations. In
addition, attentional deployment dysfunctions may account
for GD as some studies suggested that PGs have an exces-
sive attendance to positive stimuli (Hudson et al., 2013;
Molde et al., 2010). In relation to the processes of cognitive
changes for positive emotionality, we previously discussed
evidence suggesting that PGs excessively employ reapprais-
al and positive refocusing to upregulate positive emotions
(Navas et al., 2016, 2017). Finally, response-focused
strategies in relation to positive emotions have been associ-
ated with GD as wishful thinking (Jauregui, Onaindia, &
Estévez, 2017; Scannell, Quirk, Smith, Maddern, &
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Dickerson, 2000) and emotional expression (Jauregui et al.,
2017). Furthermore, interesting results came from the mul-
tidimensional investigation of impulsivity among PGs. The
construct of positive urgency, developed by Cyders and
Smith (2008a), ﬁts well with the idea that PGs have
difﬁculty in responding in an adaptive way to intense and
positive emotional states. Actually, several studies showed
that GD is related to high levels of this impulsive trait
(Blain, Richard Gill, & Teese, 2015; Cyders & Smith,
2008b; Haw, 2017; Steward et al., 2017) and that positive
urgency discriminates between at-risk and not-at-risk gam-
blers (Cyders et al., 2007).
However, differentiating PGs subtypes according to the
valence of emotional states that they struggle to regulate
may be an artiﬁcial and misleading way of reasoning,
failing to restitute the complexity of ER processing in
psychological functioning. For instance, Stewart, Zack,
Collins, and Klein (2008) examined whether affective
motivations for gambling were congruent with motivations
for alcohol abuse. In some individuals, the motivation for
drinking was coherent with the motivation for gambling as
the use of alcohol to relieve oneself from negative emo-
tional states. However, PGs who gamble to increase emo-
tional activation drink to front negative but not positive
emotional states. Such result highlights that a subtype of
PGs may have a difﬁculty regulating positive emotions,
self-medicated throughout gambling, and a difﬁculty in
regulating negative emotions compensated with alcohol
use. In other words, ER difﬁculties among PGs do not seem
consistent and may concern both negative and positive
emotions. In addition, this framework is a useful perspec-
tive from which disentangle the question of the classiﬁca-
tion (impulse control vs. addiction disorders) of GD,
providing further understanding of the role of both positive
and negative reinforcements accounting for the disorder.
Therefore, it seems rather more convincing to assert that
difﬁculty in regulating negative emotional states would be
a common factor shared by all gamblers, whereas difﬁculty
in regulating positive emotions would be an additional
characteristic of only a subtype of gamblers. Again, it
highlighted the proﬁciency of the use of ER framework in
the study of GD, promising in its capacity to shed light on
aspects still unknown of the disorder and to provide a
coherent appreciation of the complexity of the issue in the
whole population of PGs.
From a clinical point of view, our model of GD as an ER
afﬂiction suggests some interesting implications. We under-
lined that gambling activity may develop within a previous
deﬁcit in ER capacities serving as a regulator of intense
emotional states. However, we pointed out that such deﬁcits
might be multiple in nature and assessment for GD should
consequently be accurate in order to identify the speciﬁc
components that account for the development and mainte-
nance of the disorder as well as for the potential comorbidity
with other psychopathologies. Noteworthy, if several
deﬁcits in ER are identiﬁed, dysfunctions related to the
Identiﬁcation stage, as alexithymic features, should be
treated with priority. For example, it would be ineffective
to address a problem of emotional impulsivity without
previously treating a difﬁculty in emotional awareness. In
addition, we argued that the nature of emotional states,
which are difﬁcult to regulate, might account for the severity
of the disorder and be an indicator of which subtype of PGs
the patient belongs to. At this point, treatment programs
should be tailored to the speciﬁcity of PGs. For example,
interventions that target a difﬁculty in regulating negative
emotional states might be useful for the emotionally vulner-
able and the antisocial-impulsivity subtypes of gamblers,
whereas only this last category might also beneﬁt from a
treatment focusing on the difﬁculty to regulate positive
emotions.
Some of the conclusions just presented need further
empirical evidence to be considered more than just hypo-
thetical suppositions. First, future studies should attempt to
further explain the contrasting nature of the results
obtained in studies investigating alexithymia and impul-
sivity as in researches examining ER capacities of PGs
through the use of the DERS and the ERQ. Moreover,
empirical studies are urged to better examine the role of
dysregulation of positive emotions and its relationship with
dysregulation of negative emotions in GD. Then, these
studies should consider the role of comorbidity with dis-
orders that may be related to GD and dysregulation of both
negative (such as depression and anxiety) and positive
(such as antisocial personality disorder) emotional states.
For example, further research is requested to explore the
dysregulative role of helplessness and pessimism played in
GD, controlling for the effect of depression. In relation to
this, the useful constructs of emotional malleability and ER
self-efﬁcacy would be speciﬁcally proﬁcient. In addition,
there is a lack of studies that examine attentive biases of
PGs toward emotional stimuli (both positive and negative)
related to ER capacities. Such a line of research would
allow an increased understanding of potential failures in
the Perception step of ER processing. Moreover, despite
promising preliminary results, few studies investigate the
role of metacognition among PGs and none in relation to
ER: such a gap has to be fulﬁlled in order to better
understand whether metacognitive beliefs actually play a
role in emotion dysregulation among PGs (Velotti, Rogier,
& Lysaker, 2018). In addition, in relation to positive
emotion dysregulation, no studies investigated the use of
speciﬁc emotional strategies, such as savoring (Bryant,
2003) among PGs. Finally, our paper did not focus on
another relevant topic related to ER, namely ﬂexibility in
the use of ER strategies. Indeed, as previously stated
(Rogier, Garofalo, & Velotti, 2017; Velotti, Garofalo, &
Zavattini, 2013), ﬂexibility is an important characteristic of
healthy ER processes. As such, further attention should be
paid to the monitoring and switching capacities of PGs in
order to better understand the ER deﬁcits underlying the
disorder.
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